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New York

President:	Mr. Gasana/ Mr. Nduhungirehe	(Rwanda)
Members:	Argentina	Mrs. Perceval
	Australia	Ms. King
	Azerbaijan	Mr. Mehdiyev
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Briens
	Guatemala	Mr. Rosenthal
	Luxembourg	Ms. Lucas
	Morocco	Mr. Bouchaara
	Pakistan	Mr. Masood Khan
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Kim Sook
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Togo	Mr. Menan
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Meek
	United States of America	Mrs. DiCarlo

Agenda

Post-conflict peacebuilding

Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its sixth session (S/2013/63)

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13-31305 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Post-conflict peacebuilding

Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its sixth session (S/2013/63)

The President: Under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Abulkalam Abdul Momen, former Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, to participate in this meeting.

Under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Ranko Vilović, Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Croatia, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2013/63, which contains the report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its sixth session.

I now give the floor to Mr. Momen.

Mr. Momen (Bangladesh): On behalf of the members of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), I am pleased to present the report of the Commission on its sixth session as contained in document (S/2013/63).

We recall that it was you, Mr. President, in your previous capacity as Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission IN 2011, who presented the report of the PBC on its fifth session (see S/PV.6805). We are grateful for having this year's briefing, Sir, under your country's presidency of the Council.

This year's report of the Peacebuilding Commission is organized around the main functions and work of the Commission, placing particular emphasis on the results achieved and the challenges and opportunities relating to the impact of the Commission in the field and its relations with United Nations Headquarters. It mainstreams the implementation of relevant recommendations from the 2010 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture (S/2010/393, annex) and has incorporated a forward agenda for 2013 as an implementation framework for those recommendations.

Allow me to highlight a number of issues of particular importance from the report. First, the reporting period saw particular attention focused on institutional consolidation, which is crucial for the Commission's future role and impact. The Commission launched an ambitious exercise to improve and clarify its working methods, especially as they relate to its linkage and collaboration with the work of key actors in the field.

Secondly, during the reporting period, the Commission continued its focus on facilitating the work of country configurations in order to achieve the Commission's goals on the ground. To that end, the Commission had embarked on a work programme designed to support the Commission's engagement with the six countries on the agenda, namely, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The peacebuilding process in each of those six countries is at a different stage, presenting different opportunities and posing different types of challenges.

Some highlights of the Commission's country-specific engagement during the reporting period included, first, support for the launching of a national reconciliation strategy and for the first regional hub for security and justice in Liberia; secondly, support for the successful holding of elections in Sierra Leone; thirdly, resource mobilization for the peacebuilding pillar of a new poverty reduction strategy in Burundi, including through support for the successful organization of the Conference of Burundi's Development Partners held in Geneva in October 2012; and fourthly, the initiation of a resource-mapping exercise in Guinea with a view to supporting the development of a national aid management and coordination system. I thank the leadership of the respective countries for their commitment and support, without which the Commission would have not been able to achieve its goals.

Conversely, the disruption of the presidential electoral process through an unconstitutional change of Government in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April 2012 undermined the progress in peacebuilding that had begun to take place in that country. That and the violence witnessed in the Central African Republic towards the end of 2012, which has led to the challenging security, humanitarian and political situation of today, underlined that the role of the Commission's engagement needed to be more comprehensive, targeted and well coordinated. In addition, and in the absence of a broader, more

vigorous and continuing national commitment, and in the absence of coordinated efforts to address the root causes of instability, the role of the Commission in certain situations remains seriously challenged.

Thirdly, in parallel to the Commission's focus on country-specific engagement, the work undertaken by the Commission on policy development in 2012 has given priority to partnerships as an area which gives substance and value to the Commission's main functions in sustaining attention, forging coherence and mobilizing resource for the six countries on its agenda.

The work of the Commission has therefore focused on strengthening the partnership with the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Commission has taken important steps towards the promotion of the better alignment of national peacebuilding priorities in the countries on the agenda with the engagement of both banks in those countries, thus ensuring a greater degree of coherence of efforts, as well as sufficient focus on peacebuilding objectives in those countries. Given the nexus between peace and development, the Commission is also pursuing a thematic focus on job creation and rule-of-law assistance in partnership with banks and other stakeholders. The Commission sees an important linkage between those efforts to strengthen partnerships with key financial institutions and the work undertaken by the Peacebuilding Fund in support of peacebuilding priorities in the countries on the agenda.

In that regard, the Commission has continued its regular dialogue with the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Advisory Group and the Peacebuilding Support Office, with a view to further strengthening synergy and harmonization.

Fourthly, the Commission sought to deepen its working relationship with key actors in the field, especially with senior United Nations leadership. An informal dialogue with the Executive and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in agenda countries was launched in April 2012. The dialogue represented an important step in clarifying areas of mutual complementarity. That is certainly a crucial partnership requiring deeper and continuing commitment and support from the Commission's membership and the United Nations top management. In addition, dialogue with regional organizations, including the African Union Peace and Security Council, continued during the reporting period, underscoring the recognition of the African Union's central role in support of peacebuilding efforts on the continent.

Fifthly, partnership with United Nations principal organs is of no less significance. The report stipulates that members elected from each of the three principal organs need to lead the efforts to deepen and substantiate the relations with the Peacebuilding Commission. That is an area in which we expect to see further advances in 2013. In 2012, however, in view of the need to strengthen the links with United Nations field missions and enhance the impact in the field, the Commission placed particular emphasis on the relationship with the Security Council and had a very meaningful interactive dialogue with the members of the Council in July 2012. The consideration of the Commission's report on its fifth session last July in the Security Council offered an opportunity to revive the discussion on what the 2010 review described as the potential to create a new dynamic between a more forthcoming Security Council and a better-performing PBC.

Suggestions aimed at energizing the relations between the two bodies have been followed up, including through the Commission's Working Group on Lessons Learned, which explored in November 2012 the scope of the Commission's advisory role to the Council on transitions of United Nations missions in countries on the agenda. The Commission could potentially demonstrate value added by supporting a process of drawdown and withdrawal of United Nations missions that is not only grounded in sound analysis and in country-specific realities and national needs, but also ensures that the international community remains committed to, and cognizant of, the essential links between peace and socioeconomic development beyond the lifetime of United Nations peacekeeping and political missions.

Much discussion has taken place around the extent to which the Commission is delivering on the high expectations that accompanied its creation in 2005. Therefore, 2012 was a year when the question of the collective responsibility and commitment of the membership took centre stage in the Commission's deliberations. I must say that while we collectively managed to instil some sense of urgency with respect to this topic, the task of translating such commitment into concrete actions and contributions remains unfulfilled.

To that end, the High-level Event on "Peacebuilding: The way towards sustainable peace and security", which was presided over by the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in September 2012, brought together, for the first time, a number of Heads of State and Government, Ministers and senior officials from among the Commission's broader membership. The consensus political declaration that emanated from that event reaffirmed and reinvigorated the political commitment to the key principles, objectives and priorities that the Commission has consistently promoted, at both the policy and the country-specific levels.

Finally, I cannot emphasize enough the need to envisage a new paradigm for South-South and triangular cooperation which could reinforce national ownership in peacebuilding through focused support on national capacity development and institution-building in critical peacebuilding priorities. That is an area which requires further commitment from Member States and the United Nations system at large. The Peacebuilding Commission is uniquely positioned to become a platform for the development of this new paradigm by piloting concrete projects of cooperation in the countries on its agenda. The Peacebuilding Commission can certainly facilitate the matching of needs identified by those countries with the most relevant experience and expertise, especially from the global South.

In closing, I must underscore that the Commission continues to receive direct and substantive support from the Peacebuilding Support Office. As the Commission further seeks to strengthen linkages and ensure deeper collaboration and synergy with the PBF and other stakeholders, including philanthropic actors, civil society and the private and business sectors, the role of and the support received from the Office will become even more crucial.

The pace at which the United Nations and the global peacebuilding agenda are evolving testifies to the urgency of the need to address sources of protracted instability and the drivers of relapse into conflict. To that end, we can no longer afford to remain in the custody of a traditional and business-as-usual approach to the link between security and socioeconomic development. We shall continue to face systemic challenges, but we must commit to facing them with the requisite resolve and determination. We have to take bolder and more courageous steps in support of sustainable peace and security.

The President: I thank Mr. Momen for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Vilović.

Mr. Vilović: Allow me to thank the Rwandan presidency for taking the initiative in organizing this briefing on post-conflict peacebuilding and to express my appreciation for the opportunity to deliver these remarks in my capacity as Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

The annual briefings to the Security Council represent valuable opportunities to apprise the Council of the Commission's work, perspectives and priority areas. My predecessor's presentation of the Commission's report on its sixth session has shed light on where the Commission stands today with its country-specific engagement, institutional consolidation and policy-development efforts. Stemming from our founding resolutions, the main purpose of the Commission is to provide advice to the Council, and I believe that today's briefing offers an opportunity to reflect on the envisaged scope of, and prospects for, the Commission's advisory role to the Security Council.

The Commission approaches its advisory function to the Security Council from the conviction that it can play a useful role in helping the Council manage an increasing workload. By focusing on and sustaining broader international attention to situations which may not be on the Council's immediate radar, the PBC is supporting the Council in ensuring that the energy and resources invested in addressing and stabilizing conflict situations are preserved and protected for the long term. At the same time, we are convinced that this is a shared responsibility requiring improved two-way interaction between the Council and the PBC as well as much better clarity as concerns roles and responsibilities in relation to the other operational actors involved.

Members of the Council will recall last year's debate and interactive dialogue under the Colombian presidency, which highlighted a number of issues related to the Commission's advisory function to the Security Council. Those issues were captured in a summary that was shared with the Council and is contained in document S/2012/791. Today, I wish to build on elements of that summary.

First, three of the missions in countries on the PBC agenda are in the process of drawdown and transition. We believe that the Commission can and should play a role in support of the Council's consideration of

drawdown and transition strategies in those countries. Drawing on the synergies with the Peacebuilding Fund, the PBC's advice in such situations could focus on assessing progress in national peacebuilding efforts and challenges facing those efforts; the level of support from and commitment on the part of the international community beyond the United Nations system; and the specific capacities required for the United Nations presence to continue to support long-term peacebuilding efforts. Therefore, the Council could usefully benefit from interaction with the PBC during the consideration of the outcome of technical assessment missions and the drafting of the Council's resolutions on managing the transition processes. In that regard, it would be helpful if the Council were more explicit about the tasks that the PBC should undertake in support of United Nations leadership and actors in the field. The Working Group on Lessons Learned has worked closely with members of the Integration Steering Group and has developed pertinent findings on the possible role of the PBC in those transition contexts.

Secondly, where the PBC continues to be engaged following the transition and exit of a United Nations mission in a country on the PBC agenda, the Council could also benefit from periodic updates on progress with regard to peacebuilding and risk factors. That would ensure that the Council remains abreast of country-specific peacebuilding-related developments that might require attention. The continuing collaboration between the PBC, the Peacebuilding Support Office and all lead United Nations departments and relevant entities in that regard is crucial.

Thirdly, in situations where the peacebuilding process in countries on the PBC agenda faces serious challenges, the Security Council could draw on the PBC's perspectives as it considers options for its response and formulates its strategy. The situations in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic serve as reminders that peacebuilding is a process fraught with many risks and that there is a need for a coordinated response and strategy, which need to be adapted to evolving national and regional developments. Where it is engaged, the PBC can be viewed by the Council as a useful instrument of the international community's strategy to address and reverse similar situations. At the same time, the Commission recognizes that a crucial element of its advisory role to the Council is to ensure, while working closely with the senior United Nations leadership in the field, that a timely and appropriate analysis of risk factors and drivers of conflict is brought to the attention of the Council placed for its consideration and action.

The areas and situations presented here are inherently dynamic. There is, therefore, also a need for dynamic information-sharing with the Council on country-specific developments, opportunities and risks. The Chairs of the PBC country-specific configurations continue to value the opportunity to formally brief the Council on the situations in the countries concerned. We believe that more regular and substantive exchanges could possibly be of most value to the Security Council ahead of the Council's field visits to countries on the PBC agenda, upon the return from a PBC field visit to those countries, in the process of the imminent drawdown and exit of United Nations missions, and in situations presenting an obvious challenge to the peacebuilding process. We also invite the penholders of Security Council resolutions to seek the advice of the respective Chairs of the country-specific configurations when drafting resolutions concerning countries under consideration by the PBC.

In addition and most recently in its resolution 2086 (2013), the Council emphasized the need to harness the Commission's role in advancing and supporting an integrated and coherent approach to multidimensional peacekeeping mandates in countries on its agenda. There is clearly a need to take forward that recommendation and have additional clarity on the scope of the Commission's advisory role in anticipation of relevant future referrals from the Council. We look forward to discussing those and other suggestions in the context of the planned informal interactive dialogue with the Security Council to be held tomorrow.

Let me conclude by reaffirming that the PBC is committed to enhancing its impact in the field by empowering national actors to own and lead the peacebuilding process and by ensuring that the United Nations and other key actors are positioned to help them achieve that goal. We are cognizant of the fact that the PBC needs to continue to sharpen its tools and learn from the lessons of its engagement. We are also convinced that, as a parent organ providing nearly 25 per cent of the Commission's membership and having referred five out of six of the countries on the PBC agenda, the Council needs to contribute to those efforts. We must, therefore, work together to develop a practical and meaningful partnership.

The President: I now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Mr. Meek (United Kingdom): Thank you, Sir, for convening this briefing this morning. Let me also begin by thanking the current and previous Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) for their briefings.

In March this year, the Council adopted resolution 2097 (2013) on Sierra Leone, paving the way for the transition of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone. That is a real success story. As a Council, we paid tribute to the work of the United Nations system and the international partners. That work was instrumental in supporting the Government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to build a secure peace following the brutality of war. Sierra Leone is an example of why the United Kingdom believes that the United Nations plays a vital role in helping national Governments and communities recover from the scourge of war. That is why we are the largest contributor to the Peacebuilding Fund, providing almost $20 million a year, and we will shortly fulfil our promise to spend 0.7 per cent of gross national income on official development assistance. We have committed to spending one third of that rising aid budget in fragile and conflict-affected States.

The United Kingdom welcomes the recent report of the Peacebuilding Commission (S/2013/63). The report shows that the United Nations is moving forward on key peacebuilding issues and that the Commission is adding value in a number of areas. The Burundi donor conference, held in October last year, raised $2.6 billion for that country's peacebuilding priorities. The Peacebuilding Commission visits to Monrovia and Freetown provided political counsel and support as the Missions there started to draw down, and in countries across its agenda, the Peacebuilding Fund is providing much-needed financing. But much work remains.

The United Kingdom remains a friend of United Nations peacebuilding, and as friends, it is important that we are honest. We believe the PBC has not fully realized the potential that was envisaged for it when it was established in 2006. We must all share responsibility for that gap and work together to develop the Commission into the effective, efficient organization that it could and should be. The United Kingdom sees three key areas for action.

First, the Commission must focus more on activities that add value and have a real impact on the ground in the countries on its agenda. The recent achievements of the country-specific configurations should act as an example for the Commission as a whole, and we would like to see a much greater emphasis on country-specific work. That should align with and take forward the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, putting into practice the Deal's principles for engagement.

Secondly, in order to free up time and resources to focus on countries on the PBC agenda, we must significantly reduce the level of process and procedure here in New York. More meetings on organizational issues, processes and procedure means less time available for country-focused work. The Commission should meet less frequently and with substantive agendas containing clear and necessary decisions to take.

Thirdly, the Commission must continue to strengthen relationships with United Nations missions in those countries on its agenda. As we have seen from some of the successes of the past year, the Commission is most effective when it works through the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and augments their work. The configuration Chairs should use their convening power in New York to bring the international system together around the work of the in-country mission and the Government of that country.

We believe that improvement in those areas will build the foundation for a stronger relationship between the PBC and the main United Nations organs. With greater focus and drive to achieve results, the PBC can provide valuable advice to the Security Council and the General Assembly. We look forward to the next review of the PBC, in 2015, which will be an opportunity to look critically at where the Commission has been successful and where it has not. The United Kingdom stands ready to engage constructively in those discussions over the coming months and years. We should be ambitious in our drive to reform the United Nations peacebuilding architecture to ensure that it reaches its full potential and has tangible and positive effects for the countries on its agenda.

Mr. Kim Sook (Republic of Korea): I thank Ambassador Momen and Ambassador Vilović for their briefings.

Last year we witnessed both progress and setbacks in the peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi have achieved tangible results in their efforts to develop a national reconciliation strategy, including the successful

conduct of elections and resource mobilization for a new poverty-reduction strategy. By contrast, the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau relapsed into conflict and have yet to restore constitutional order.

Tolstoy once wrote that happy families are all alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. Similarly, the ways in which peace is maintained often resemble one another, while when it is disturbed, it is disturbed in different ways for different reasons. That is why a one-size-fits-all solution cannot work for every conflict. Peacebuilding is constantly evolving, a process informed by trial and error. It is therefore important to draw lessons from both successes and failures. It goes without saying that peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding overlap and intertwine with each other. For peacebuilding to be effective, therefore, early peacebuilding tasks should be carefully incorporated into all multidimensional peacekeeping mandates from the beginning. Since a particular success story does not guarantee the same result in another case, every situation requires its own tailored prescription.

That need for a flexible response, however, presents the Security Council with a dilemma. The instruments that the Charter of the United Nations grants to the Council must be used with greater consistency and predictability. That is where the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Security Council can find room for mutual cooperation in the service of a common goal. The PBC's architecture enables a flexible response to each specific situation through its platform of country-specific configurations. The Commission can be more receptive to the particular requests of countries on its agenda and can work with them through its unique advocacy role, building partnerships and marshalling resources, while the Security Council focuses on its primary responsibility for international peace and security. The PBC is a fund-raiser, promoter, counsellor and adviser. In that regard, the essence of cooperation between the Council and the PBC lies in their division of labour.

The transition from political mission to country team is the phase that requires the greatest cooperation between the two bodies. In order for a transition to proceed coherently, national development plans must be made in consultation with the Government, development partners and civil society, starting with the initial planning stage. Resolution 2097 (2013), adopted last month, extending the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, is a good example; the role of the PBC in the gradual drawdown of the political mission in Sierra Leone was properly stressed.

All successful peacebuilding includes some common factors: substantial progress in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR); strong national ownership; active regional engagement; and the strong support of the international community. Support for SSR and DDR should be a particular priority in post-conflict peacebuilding. We have often witnessed how post-conflict societies with less successful SSR and DDR processes quickly relapse into conflict. We hope that the Secretary-General's report on the assessment of United Nations support for SSR, prepared by the Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, will provide comprehensive and systematic direction for future efforts.

The significance of national ownership cannot be overemphasized. National actors should be empowered to own and lead the peacebuilding process. Without engagement at the grass-roots level, resilient peacebuilding will be elusive. Democratic and inclusive leadership is also indispensable for national reconciliation. The United Nations should work together with legitimate Governments with a view to integrating peacebuilding efforts into their national development strategies.

Development plans in a post-conflict society are not sustainable without stable resources. We commend the Chair Group's dialogue with senior officials of the World Bank, and expect the PBC to continue its cooperation with financial institutions, especially the World Bank and the African Development Bank. As suggested in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the product of the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011, we should continue to develop an integrated development strategy and to align those resources to get results.

My delegation hopes that the Security Council will continue to cooperate with the PBC to maximize the achievements of peacebuilding based on mutual comparative advantage.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The chief task of peacebuilding is to eliminate the root causes of conflicts and preventing their resurgence. All of that must be primarily based on States' internal efforts, since in that area the role of

the United Nations and regional organizations is one of support for national efforts. Peacebuilding assistance, given its long-term nature, should provide incentives for national Governments to rely on their own strengths. In that context, aid can be multidimensional and can extend to diverse areas: reaching and implementing peace agreements; stabilizing security; strengthening Government institutions, human rights, the rule of law and national reconciliation; and aid to development. The mobilization of international aid must be coordinated, so that it deals with the principal problems and supplements national efforts.

As far as the United Nations is concerned, we are obliged, unfortunately, to conclude that, despite all the efforts of peacekeeping missions, peacebuilding offices and Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) country configurations, aid to post-conflict countries remains fragmentary. The importance of improving coordination and the division of labour between participants in the process, and of systematizing the peacebuilding processes, is obvious. The existing architecture's potential is far from being fully realized.

In our view, therefore, the relevant United Nations entities should implement their peacebuilding activities on the basis of their mandates in order to ensure the necessary legal basis for their own actions. Complying with the principles of respect for the sovereignty of post-conflict States and recognizing national responsibility and national priorities for peacebuilding should be absolute imperatives. The Government of the country concerned, representing the interests of the whole of society, must play a leading role in providing that responsibility.

In our support for the work of the Peacebuilding Commission as one of the central intergovernmental bodies for coordinating peacebuilding assistance, we note the added value represented by the valuable consultative assistance it gives to the Security Council, when requested, concerning countries on the Council's agenda. Within its existing mandate, the Commission should contribute to dealing with important crosscutting issues relating to peacebuilding that are relevant to the entire United Nations system and that require comprehensive discussion with Member States within the framework of United Nations specialized entities.

Russia is an active participant in the activity of the PBC and is committed to improving its effectiveness. We are convinced that the Commission is a unique intergovernmental body and that we should, therefore, make full use of its potential. In that regard, it is essential that the Commission find solutions that are acceptable and supported by all its members. The key to that is to improve its standing and increase, commensurately, the interest in its work by the broader international community.

Much remains to be done to optimize and improve the results of the Commission's activity. In a number of countries on its agenda, significant results have been achieved in terms of alleviating the causes of conflicts, strengthening State institutions and coordinating and mobilizing resources. However, there are also the examples of Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic, where we see a drastic deterioration of the situation. In those cases, peacebuilding was clearly insufficient. It is clear that formulas that work well in some contexts do not always work well in others.

In that connection, we would like to underscore once again the importance of the responsibility of national Governments for the peacebuilding process and in determining priorities, as well as the need to precisely determine peacebuilding assistance, tailoring it to the needs of individual States during the specific time frame. It is counterproductive to promote the most recent trends in peacebuilding, especially those based on a universal model, at the expense of the pressing needs of States.

There is no doubt that peacebuilding is a political process. However, it is also clear that assistance for economic development, addressing pressing social problems and job creation can mitigate political conflicts. The United Nations funds and programmes play a key role in that regard.

In taking stock of the activity of the Commission in 2012, I would like to express my appreciation to the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Mr. Abulkalam Momen, for his work as Chair of the PBC. The past year has been eventful for the Commission, and we welcome the results it has achieved.

A number of challenges for the future were identified in the Commission's report (S/2013/63). The programme is ambitious and aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Commission's work in coordinating international peacebuilding efforts and in formulating recommendations to ensure continuous coordinated international assistance to the countries on its agenda, as well as the streamlining of its working methods.

We are convinced that the current Chair of the Commission, the Permanent Representative of Croatia, Mr. Ranko Vilović, will continue to move forward those endeavours.

Mr. Menan (Togo) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for including the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding on the agenda of the Security Council during your presidency. I would also like to thank Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen of Bangladesh and Ambassador Ranko Vilović of Croatia for their statements.

The Organization, through regular debates on post-conflict peacebuilding, provides the members of the Council with the opportunity to assess the work being done on the ground by the Peacebuilding Commission, the country-specific configurations and the countries on its agenda. The importance of the work of the Peacebuilding Commission should be measured by its real contribution to the process of reconstruction and reconciliation and the establishment of the rule of law. Those actions are carried out over the long term, and the results are often not quantifiable in the short term.

Taking into account the issues that fall within the comprehensive framework of reconstruction and development calls for the participation of as broad a group as possible of different actors, both national and international, in particular the United Nations system, in the identification of priorities. It is important that we place greater emphasis on such an approach.

My delegation welcomes the fact that, in recent years, collaboration with and listening to the main beneficiaries have helped advance the agenda of the United Nations in the field of peacebuilding. The credit for that result is due to the Commission itself and the peacebuilding country teams.

Togo believes that post-conflict peacebuilding remains, first and foremost, the responsibility of the State concerned. It goes without saying that the State's role is a determing factor in ensuring the success of that endeavour, because it is up to that country to define the priorities and establish a framework for cooperation and partnership with the support of national, international and regional actors.

However, it seems that, in defining priorities, there is a problem of non-inclusiveness — of not taking into account the interests of various parts of the population. For example, the identification of the needs of vulnerable groups, in particular those of women and children, is crucial in the peacebuilding process. Women are the main victims of conflicts, so it is fitting that they should be involved in all phases of the peacebuilding process. Moreover, an inclusive approach that takes into account all needs will facilitate the participation of all actors and will later strengthen national ownership of the actions undertaken within the peacebuilding framework.

Another aspect relates to the assistance that should be made available to post-conflict States, which are still fragile, whatever their size and economic potential. It is therefore important that States in the region, financial institutions and the international community as a whole provide their support to those countries and help them to establish frameworks for sustainable cooperation and partnerships, which, in our opinion, are what determine the success of peacebuilding. In most cases, the interest attached to a country, especially one emerging from conflict, is determined by the wealth of its land and not really by the need to ensure that it does not fall into another conflict as a result of a lack of adequate support. Since the creation of the Commission, however, we are happy to see that the Commission is increasingly working to reverse that kind of tendency. That is why we believe that the African Solidarity Initiative, launched by the African Union on 13 July 2012, which aims to encourage and motivate African States to support the efforts of reconstruction and development in countries emerging from conflict and to strengthen their capacity to that end, should be supported.

Another factor in the success of any peacebuilding process is the coordination of actions. Given that many institutions are involved in the peacebuilding process, we must ensure that a framework is in place to coordinate all the actions undertaken, so as to avoid duplication and wasting resources and energy. That coordination should make it possible to create frameworks for exchanging experiences in order to adopt actions that have been successful and consider how the implementation of those actions can be adapted to other countries that find themselves in similar situations. We note with satisfaction that the report (S/2013/63) under review shares that view. It is essential that the Security Council provide its support in order to implement the recommendations contained in the report.

How long a post-conflict country remains on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission depends on

the progress achieved on the ground. In most cases, the countries concerned and the institutions that support them take time to establish the transitional mechanisms between peacebuilding and the country's assumption of control over its situation. My country believes that those kinds of mechanisms should be established at the beginning of the process.

Togo continues to believe that the various tasks assigned to the Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council demonstrate the commitment of those bodies to providing assistance to countries emerging from conflict. They must act in a spirit of cooperation and complementarity. The international community should continue to sustainably support the Commission in its efforts to promote peace and security in post-conflict countries with a view to ensuring that the country does not slip back into violence.

In conclusion, my country would like to take the opportunity of this debate to express its deep gratitude to the Peacebuilding Commission for the satisfactory results achieved in some countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi. Togo commends the efforts of the countries, organizations and institutions that support the daily work of the Commission and the country configurations.

Mr. Wang Min (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I would like to convey my gratitude to Ambassador Momen and Ambassador Vilović for their briefings.

During the past year, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has continued to very actively implement the tasks entrusted to it under the relevant mandates of the General Assembly and the Security Council to attempt to assist post-conflict States in rebuilding themselves, and it continues to play an important role in that respect. Bangladesh, during its chairmanship of the PBC, undertook the initiative in September of organizing a high-level meeting of the PBC, thereby lending renewed momentum to the work in the field of peacebuilding. China wishes to express admiration for that sterling work.

It is also necessary to recognize that peacebuilding is a long-term, complex, difficult and comprehensive task. In the current context, it is facing a great many new obstacles and challenges. This state of affairs requires serious consideration that could result in an appropriate response on the part of the international community.

The Chinese delegation would like to make the following comments.

First, respect for the ownership of relevant States should be one of the principles underlying all peacebuilding. Post-conflict countries bear the main burden for peace and security in their own territories, and the international community should fully respect their sovereignty and the will and provide constructive assistance pursuant to the priorities determined by those States themselves. We advocate working on an equal footing with less arrogance, more friendly consultations and fewer attempts to force recipes on the affected countries.

Secondly, we want to help post-conflict countries to devise comprehensive strategies for post-conflict reconstruction in accordance with their own specificities. All our histories are different; all our specific circumstances are different. There is no single model for peacebuilding. The international community should fully abide by and respect the cultural traditions of the countries concerned, listen attentively to their views and not just mechanically copy existing templates. The international community should give this in-depth consideration.

Thirdly, socioeconomic development should be the main way to build peace. In its peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict States, the international community has longtended to focus on human rights, the rule of law and security sector reform, perhaps without granting sufficient attention to economic and social development. Real investment is often lacking. We urge the international community to grant heightened attention to the socioeconomic development of States by providing them with more genuine assistance. Assistance should not come with preconditions. We hope that the PBC will look at where it can add value, assist countries in mobilizing the necessary resources, and coordinate the efforts undertaken by the international community as a whole.

Fourthly, there is a need to pursue efforts aimed at improving the working methods and effectiveness of the PBC. We support the PBC in its desire to improve its internal working methods, learn lessons, identify best practices, and improve coordination and cooperation with the main United Nations bodies, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic

and Social Council, among others; to involve the international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; and to fully listen to relevant regional organizations. It is important for all of us to work together to achieve progress in peacebuilding in post-conflict countries.

Mr. Rosenthal (Guatemala) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, allow me to thank the delegation of Rwanda for having organized this informative meeting. We would also like to express our appreciation to Ambassadors Abulkalam Abdul Momen and Ranko Vilović for their briefings on the recent evolution of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). We also appreciate the 29 January report of the Commission (S/2013/63).

For Guatemala, the Peacebuilding Commission, despite its complex architecture and its growing pains, which have had their ups and downs, is an important institutional link between the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and the Bretton Woods institutions. We therefore believe that its creation marked an important milestone in the institutional development of the United Nations.

It became clear during the debates organized under the Colombian presidency of the Council in July (see S/PV.6805) and that of Morocco in December 2012 (S/PV.6897) that there is a consensus that the Peacebuilding Commission has not yet reached its full potential. At the same time, there also appears to be a consensus on the enormous potential of that forum to draw on the efforts of the Security Council in peacekeeping in order to cover the reconstruction and transformation stages leading to the normalization of a country emerging from conflict.

In that regard, the United Nations has the experience of more than six decades in addressing the needs of societies in conflict with respect to peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace consolidation and in trying to prevent countries that have emerged from conflict from relapsing. The stages of those different categories are not necessarily sequential; they overlap and support one other in a reciprocal manner. The link between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, which is the matter before us today, is therefore especially relevant.

Ambassador Vilović noted that the main purpose of the Commission is to provide advice to the Council, particularly when it relates to countries on the agenda of the Council that form part of a specific country configuration. With all due respect, we believe that of equal or even greater importance is the role contemplated in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 60/180, which refers to the need of all interested actors in a country-specific situation — and these certainly include the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission — to act in a coordinated manner and, as the English expression has it, "be on the same page". Those coordinated efforts are also reflected in the 2012–2013 strategy prepared by the Peacebuilding Support Office.

Under either of those functions — advisory or coordination — it should be recognized that there is still a long way to go, as I said earlier, to meet the expectations placed on the PBC when it was created. To fulfil those expectations, there are undoubtedly concrete actions that could be taken by the Commission, and others that we can and should take in the Security Council. I will mention five points.

First, although resolution 60/180 grants the Security Council the opportunity to appoint seven members of the Commission, including the five permanent members, nothing prevents other Council members from being elected as part of the representation of the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. In fact, that has happened. Last year, 11 members of the Council were also members of the Commission, and we have seen cases in the past — we have one such case at the present time — whereby Council members have presided over country-specific configurations. Presumably, those representatives who are members of both forums ought to bear in mind the potential for seeking closer cooperation and mutual support.

Secondly, the Council should continue and broaden the past practice of inviting the Chairs of the country-specific configurations to take part in our discussions when the country concerned is on the Council agenda. That practice could also be expanded to other contexts, such as informal consultations among Council members and the country-specific configuration, when countries that are in the process of peacebuilding slip back into a recurrence of conflict. The current situations in the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau are such examples.

Thirdly, when drafting mandate renewals for peacekeeping operations, it would be worthwhile to include, when appropriate, some linkages to the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. Our experts should at least bear that possibility in mind.

Fourthly, and here I am borrowing an idea from Ambassador Vilović, we should consider the participation of the PBC in the technical assessment missions that are carried out prior to the gradual drawdown of a peacekeeping operation.

Fifthly, when a Security Council mission travels to a PBC country-specific configuration, that configuration should be involved. Similarly, when a PBC mission travels to a country that is on the agenda of the Security Council, consultations between both bodies should take place.

Before concluding, I would like to refer very briefly to Ambassador Momen's statement, which is organized around the main functions and work of the Commission, placing particular emphasis on the results achieved and the challenges and opportunities related to the impact of the Commission in the field and its relations at United Nations Headquarters. We particularly appreciate the comments from Ambassador Momen and would like to thank him for the fact that during his presidency he launched, in September of last year, the initiative of organizing a high-level event, entitled "Peacebuilding: the way towards sustainable peace and security", which was presided over by the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. The consensus political declaration that emanated from that event reaffirmed and reinvigorated the political commitment to the key principles, objectives and priorities of the Commission.

In summary, we have the impression that both bodies — the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission — tend to function too much like two distinct and separate compartments, with minimum communication sufficient only to fulfil formalities and apparently with little enthusiasm, as was pointed out in the recent publication by the non-governmental organization Security Council Report dated 18 April 2013, which focused precisely on that subject. If I may be allowed to make a personal comment, as a member both of the Security Council and the PBC, I believe that it is within our reach to change that situation and overcome it.

Mr. Briens (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen, outgoing Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and his successor, Ambassador Ranko Vilović, for their briefings and their strong personal commitment to the Commission.

A number of recent crises, such as that in Guinea-Bissau last spring or that which began in December in the Central African Republic, show the extent to which the peacebuilding process is a hard road. The United Nations and the PBC in particular face a number of very complicated problems. The most recent report of the PBC (S/2013/63) quite rightly underscores both the potential and the limitations of the Commission — a body which would be hard tasked to singlehandedly address the underlying causes of instability. The support that the Commission can provide must indeed itself be accompanied by a strong commitment on the part of national stakeholders — national ownership is essential in that context — and lasting support from international partners.

The PBC has, of late, achieved encouraging results in a number of fields. First, in terms of political assistance, the PBC has, for example, helped in implementing a national reconciliation strategy in Liberia and is supporting the Government as it resumes its responsibilities, which are being transferred back from the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

Secondly, with regard to partnership development and resource mobilization, the poverty reduction strategy in Burundi, for example, was able to make progress, which was crucially the result of cooperation between the PBC and the World Bank. That strategy enjoyed the support of a donors conference held in Geneva, which provided an opportunity for dialogue between Burundi and its partners.

Thirdly, with regard to strengthening the coherence of activities carried out in the field of peacebuilding, I would refer to the example of the cooperation between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Fund, which allowed approximately 4,000 troops to be retired, which has contributed to progress in security sector reform in that country.

All of that progress is positive, but efforts must be continued so as to ensure that the Commission be able to play its full role. Among the principles in the field of peacebuilding, set as priorities by the Secretary-General in 2012, I would like to underscore two in particular. First, a long-term approach is essential, because peacebuilding is a difficult process that requires solid foundations to be laid, starting with the rule of law, a police force and a justice system. The absence of those elements makes it impossible for a lasting peace to be built.

The PBC must also enable a country to emerge from a cycle of violence. In the absence of credible police or military forces, it is too often armed groups that take control of a region or a State. The current crisis in the Central African Republic shows us the extent to which peacebuilding is a process that is both very fragile and reversible. The work of the PBC must therefore have a long-term perspective.

Secondly, in order to be viable, peacebuilding processes must be inclusive, that is, they should bring together all sectors of society. The increasing recognition of the role of women in peacebuilding is positive. We welcome in particular the decision of Nepal, which, on the basis of resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), has drawn up a national action plan to make women an integral part of peacebuilding. The efforts of the PBC and of its Organizational Committee regularly to address that issue should continue.

Beyond the general principles for implementing peacebuilding, we believe that the PBC must also improve its methods. In that regard, there are two critical aspects.

First, the coordinating role of the PBC must be strengthened in order to prevent the assistance provided to countries on its agenda from being too fragmented or inconsistent. Within the United Nations, exchanges among the various bodies and relevant agencies should continue. We welcome the Security Council's holding of an interactive dialogue with the PBC. We are interested in the conclusion of the Commission's report that proposes considering areas in which the PBC could more closely cooperate with the General Assembly. We also underscore the fact that subregional organizations play an increasing role in post-conflict periods. It is therefore important that their views be taken into account in the context of country configurations. A more fluid dialogue with such organizations is desirable.

Finally, the initiatives outside the United Nations, such as, for example, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, also merit the Commission's attention. The partnership between the PBC and the international financial institutions, the private sector and philanthropic organizations is also important. We believe that the work in that direction must be pursued in order to mobilize resources, identify financing gaps and duplication and define priorities in partnership with the State concerned.

Lastly, we believe that relations between the Commission in New York and in the field must be improved. For instance, there should be a more flexible exchange of information between the Commission here and its field offices. For example, there are regular contacts between the Chairs of the PBC country configurations and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

Mrs. DiCarlo (United States of America): Let me thank Ambassador Momen for his capable chairmanship of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2012 and to congratulate Ambassador Vilović on his assumption of the Chair for 2013. I thank them both for their briefings today.

The United States appreciates the contributions of Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office and recognizes the value of the PBC as a common platform for international actors working in support of sustainable peace and development. From mobilizing resources to developing partnerships and building bridges among the different United Nations entities in support of peacebuilding objectives, the PBC continues to evolve to reach its full potential. We share the Secretary-General's view that strong national ownership of the peacebuilding process, a closer relationship between Headquarters and United Nations actors in the field and the prioritization of resources are essential to the PBC's success.

In that regard, I would like to focus on three areas where the PBC has a great opportunity for added value: political governance, economic governance and justice and security sector reform.

Peace and security require a basic political agreement on the structures of Government and the rules of politics. Effective, resilient and inclusive governance institutions are essential to ending recurring conflict and to enabling long-term and broad-based economic growth and development. As President Obama said in 2009, good governance is the ingredient that can unlock Africa's enormous potential.

Following the successful national elections in Sierra Leone, for example, the PBC's role in developing coherent and short- and long-term peacebuilding objectives and in identifying national capacity gaps, particularly related to governance, is increasingly important.

International support however cannot substitute for the national Government or overcome the absence of a durable political settlement. We note that the PBC's engagement in Guinea-Bissau has been suspended following the April 2012 coup d'état and that the Central African Republic has started down a similarly troubling path. Before the Central African Republic can stabilize and develop, the constitutional order must be restored and the Libreville and N'Djamena Agreements implemented. The Commission must be prepared to step in and facilitate international support for effective Government institutions once conditions allow.

Unlocking the vast and untapped potential of women as political leaders and in building governance institutions is essential. Every effort must be made to ensure that women are included and supported, as the PBC helps national actors to interface with the United Nations system, to mobilize the appropriate resources and to generate the momentum for further support and positive action.

Economic governance is equally important to post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. Partnerships with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional development banks are critical since those organizations have the tools and the expertise to build the capacity of public finance institutions. In Burundi, the PBC's engagement with the international financial institutions led to the inclusion of the peacebuilding priorities in its second-generation poverty reduction strategy. Furthermore, thanks in no small part to the efforts of Ambassador Seger and the country configuration, more than $2.5 billion was pledged at the October 2012 Burundi partners conference.

Indeed, the PBC's ability to mobilize resources and to ensure the inclusivity of women and underrepresented groups is crucial to countries transitioning from conflict to development phases. However, donors must have confidence in the country's capacity to absorb and manage its contributions responsibly.

Beyond the need for capable political and economic governance, ordinary citizens must feel safe and secure in their daily lives for peacebuilding to succeed. They need to be able to trust in the rule of law and the State security forces. Yet, in the aftermath of conflict, there is usually a need to build up the justice sector, while the security sector is typically in need of reform and downsizing. Women need to take part and to be included in reforming the institutions of law and security so that the needs of the entire society are met. The PBC can and should help sustain the political momentum for such efforts.

In Liberia, the PBC not only facilitated the participation of key stakeholders in establishing justice hubs to bring security and justice services to Liberians outside the capital. It also helped to enable a structured road map that kept the project on track and coordinated. We understand that the first hub is already providing essential services, including counselling to victims of sexual and gender-based violence.

Too often our attention is focused acutely on ending the fighting and stopping the bloodshed but, when the guns fall silent, the wounds of war are far from healed and the causes of conflict far from resolved. For that reason, the PBC remains important and must continue to improve its effectiveness in catalysing the political momentum and in mobilizing the resources needed to assist countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

Mr. Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan): At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting to discuss the report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its sixth session (S/2013/63). We also express our appreciation to the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Mr. Abulkalam Abdul Momen, for his excellent leadership of the Commission last year. I would also like to welcome the Permanent Representative of Croatia, Mr. Ranko Vilović, as the new Chairperson of the Commission and wish him every success in fulfilling that demanding responsibility.

The issuance of the present report in a new format allows for an in-depth assessment of progress and limitations in the implementation of the recommendations of the 2010 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture (S/2010/393, annex). It is noteworthy that, by drawing examples from the experiences of the country-specific configurations, the report places particular emphasis on the results achieved and the challenges and opportunities related to the Commission's work in the countries on its agenda.

The Peacebuilding Commission was established to bring coordination, coherence and integrity to the United Nations peacebuilding efforts with a view to addressing the special needs of countries emerging from conflict. Because peacebuilding processes depend heavily on existing circumstances on the ground and changing global realities, such as the current international financial situation, the Commission cannot meet all expectations or fully secure a central role in rebuilding

war-torn societies. The Commission's added value will be most apparent if it takes more practical approaches, such as marshalling potential donors and mobilizing resources for the countries on its agenda in line with their priorities.

The sense of national ownership is at the core of peacebuilding. The Governments of countries on the Commission's agenda bear primary responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction policies, including identification of their own needs and priorities. Positive developments, such as the launch of Liberia's national reconciliation strategy, the successful conduct of elections in Sierra Leone and resource mobilization in support of a new poverty reduction strategy in Burundi underscore the critical importance of national ownership in and continued commitment to peacebuilding. Serious setbacks in the Commission's activities caused by the crises in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic highlight the urgent need for cardinal solutions to the root causes of recurring instability in those countries.

Peacebuilding efforts will yield true results if they strive to build and develop the institutional capacities of post-conflict countries. The establishment of viable State institutions with solid capacities is a key prerequisite that underpins the effectiveness of peacebuilding and fosters national ownership. International assistance for the countries on the agenda should be aimed at developing national systems that are able to attract sustainable financial and technical support.

The Commission's efforts to strengthen partnership with international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank, on the basis of complementarity between their respective roles in support of national peacebuilding strategies, should be further continued. It is also important to establish proper mechanisms and procedures that will ensure greater coordination and coherence among key actors in the field and the alignment of their activities with the recipient Governments' agendas.

We also underline the necessity of improved interaction and coordination between the Commission and senior representatives of the United Nations in the countries concerned. That interaction will increase the shared understanding of respective comparative advantages, roles and responsibilities and help identify areas where relations could be mutually reinforcing.

I would like to conclude by commending the dedicated work of the Chairs of the country-specific configurations. The relevance of the Commission and the effectiveness of its overall work are judged by the impact of its configurations on the ground. We are looking forward to tomorrow's informal interactive dialogue, where we will reflect on various aspects of the Commission's and configurations' activities, assess achievements and analyse existing challenges in a candid and detailed manner.

Mr. Masood Khan (Pakistan): I thank the Rwandan presidency for having organized today's meeting. We thank the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen, and appreciate his dynamic and successful stewardship of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2012. We also thank the Permanent Representative of Croatia, Ambassador Ranko Vilović, for his briefing and wish him success in his role as Chairman of the PBC for 2013.

Peacebuilding has become an integral part of the United Nations architecture for the maintenance of international peace and security. Embedding peacebuilding tasks in early phases of United Nations interventions and missions fosters stability and prevents relapses. Last year, the Security Council's thematic meetings and the PBC's own work led to coherent, efficient and predictable responses by the United Nations to peacebuilding in the countries emerging from conflict.

The efforts of the Council and the PBC are focused on the following three concepts: first, prioritizing targeted areas of post-conflict peacebuilding to focus on security sector reform, the rule of law, local capacity-building and economic revitalization; secondly, forging a coherent and seamless response to conflicts by refining the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, while drawing on comparative advantage of the various United Nations entities, with a view to ensuring stable transition, consolidation and sustainable peace; and thirdly, sharpening the emphasis on development aspects to move post-conflict peacebuilding towards recovery and socioeconomic development.

By virtue of its unique composition, the PBC is well placed to advise the Security Council on policy developments, institutional consolidation and country-specific engagements with respect to post-conflict peacebuilding. For the Security Council, the advisory

role of the PBC is pertinent in the context of both specific situations and thematic issues.

There is a need to harness the PBC's role in the work of the Security Council, particularly while conceiving peacebuilding mandates. In January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2086 (2013), which underscored the centrality of the PBC as an advisory and resource mobilization body for peacebuilding. The resolution identifies priority areas of peacebuilding in a multidimensional peacekeeping mandate. It clarifies and reinforces the relationships between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The resolution helps build stronger partnerships for a collective response to challenges to peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. While steering resolution 2086 (2013) in the Council, we were guided by our experience as a founding member of the PBC and a leading troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping.

Since the creation of the PBC in 2006, we have learned the value of aligning the strategic framework of peacebuilding with respective national priorities and policies. All peacebuilding endeavours should be under complete national ownership and tailored to local requirements. The gender perspective is very important in peacebuilding. Lasting peace will remain elusive without improving the conditions of women and other vulnerable segments of society. For a long-term economic recovery and social cohesion, women's access to health, education and entrepreneurship is essential.

We value the work of the country-specific configurations of the PBC. Those configurations are taking important initiatives in resource mobilization through international financial institutions (IFIs) and non-United Nations sources of funding. The success of a country-specific configuration is ensured by its ability to fine-tune its contributions as dynamics of a post-conflict situation evolve. We support regular interaction among the respective configurations, the PBC Organizational Committee and the Security Council so that lessons learned may be shared and coherence promoted.

Post-conflict peacebuilding should instil confidence and provide tangible benefits to the countries on the agenda. Peacebuilding assistance must be distinct from classical models of development assistance, both in terms of target sectors and conditions attached to the funding. As funding for peacebuilding increasingly taps into international financial institutions, we should remain sensitive to the distinction between peacebuilding and development needs.

The engagement of IFIs with peacebuilding does not diminish the importance of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The catalytic role of the PBF in attracting other sources of funding makes it an essential component of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.

Pakistan has been contributing to the PBF. We agree with the apt characterization of contributions to the PBF as an "investment in peace". Member States and the Secretariat need to provide the PBF with the resources and operational flexibility to make it more efficient. Besides finances, peacebuilding initiatives require adequate human resources. The Secretary-General's initiative on civilian capacities is important in identifying expertise to be tailored to specific needs in the context of for post-conflict peacebuilding.

The civilian capabilities process should stand up to intergovernmental scrutiny and avoid duplication of roles, and it must be compliant with United Nations rules and procedures. As a member of the Organizational Committee of the PBC, we reiterate our strong commitment to and support for United Nations peacebuilding endeavours. We share the hope that our collective peacebuilding efforts will benefit conflict-affected peoples in different parts of the world.

Ms. King (Australia): I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this briefing. Allow me to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Momen and Ambassador Vilović for their briefings and for their respective leadership of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

This discussion and the interactive dialogue that we will have tomorrow are very timely as we head towards the 2015 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.

We all are familiar with the statistics on the relapse of post-conflict States into violence. The situations preoccupying the Council provide clear illustrations: the relapse into violence in the Central African Republic; last year's coup in Guinea-Bissau, its fourth since independence; and the recent violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The PBC, together with the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office, were established to fill gaps in the United Nations capacity to assist post-conflict States to avoid relapses. At

that time, there was little in the way of peacebuilding architecture in other forums. The field is now relatively crowded. While it has been rightly acknowledged that the PBC has yet to realize its full potential, there are useful lessons we can draw on to provide it with guidance on fulfilling its core mandate.

I will focus my remarks on three areas.

First, the PBC's value-add and impact in the field. The core challenge is how a New York-based organization can make an impact on the lives of people on the ground. The PBC works well when it uses its comparative advantage as a Member States-based entity to play a strong political accompaniment role. The organization can deliver coordinated and targeted messages at key times. We saw this in the lead-up to Sierra Leone's successful elections last November.

However, further efforts will be needed to strengthen practical impact in the field. Country-specific configurations must focus on supporting Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General and Resident Coordinators. They can add weight to advocacy, mobilize Member State engagement and draw attention in New York to threats and challenges. Their effectiveness depends on their relationships with host Governments and with Special Representatives and Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General, and the depth of their understanding of the situation on the ground.

The second issue is partnerships. As noted in the annual report (S/2013/63) before us today and as mentioned by Ambassador Momen, the PBC has made serious efforts over the past year to strengthen partnerships and build valuable synergies with financial institutions, especially the World Bank and the African Development Bank. We are pleased to see those strands coming together. Greater coherence between the PBF, the World Bank's State and Peacebuilding Fund and the African Development Bank's Fragile States Facility helps minimize duplication and ensures that we can leverage economies of scale. The PBC can play a strong political role to complement the work of the financial institutions.

Often the PBC is criticized for failure to mobilize resources, but this is a constant challenge at the moment in times of fiscal austerity. The PBC must therefore look to non-traditional donors, including the private sector.

Country configurations can help coordinate donor efforts to minimize duplication and identify gaps. We welcome the pilot mapping exercise of Guinea's peacebuilding priorities, and the Working Group on Lessons Learned is also doing important thinking on the organization of donor conferences, building on the successful conference on Burundi last year.

We welcome the efforts of the PBC to support new models of partnership between conflict-affected States and development partners. It absolutely makes sense for the PBC to align its country-specific commitments with national peacebuilding priorities. For example, the Sierra Leone and Liberia configurations have supported the two pilot countries in implementing the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States by aligning their mutual commitments with those countries' development strategies, which is logical.

The third issue is the role of women. Engaging women in peacebuilding settlement and post-conflict decision-making processes is vital to ensuring sustainable recovery and long-term peace. More effort is needed to take forward the Secretary-General's seven-point action plan on gender-responsive peacebuilding.

As an example of efforts in that area, we are working closely with Pacific Islands chiefs of police to support female police officers to undertake the relevant training, and we are developing police deployment gender strategies to promote the participation and protection of women in conflict and post-conflict settings.

We encourage the Peacebuilding Fund to maintain its commitment to the Secretary-General's target of allocating 15 per cent of United Nations-managed funds to projects addressing women's needs and empowerment.

Finally, let me say a few words on the interaction between the Council and the PBC. The key issue is how both bodies can work in pursuit of the same objectives. The Council should draw on the PBC's expertise more readily, and the PBC should draw to the Council's attention emerging threats in the countries on its agenda.

We fully agree with Ambassador Vilović's comment that the PBC can and should have a role during the Council's consideration of mandate renewals and in transitions in United Nations missions. Sierra Leone is a good example.

Similarly, in Liberia, as the United Nations Mission in Liberia continues its transition process, the PBC configuration is well placed to highlight to the Council any risks to the timeline and provide guidance to it.

In concluding, let me assure the Council of our commitment to ensuring that the PBC continues to develop its role and strengthen its partnerships so that it can make a real difference to the people who suffer the most from relapses into conflict.

Mr. Bouchaara (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this briefing. We would also like to congratulate the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh and former Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the outstanding work that he did during his mandate. We would like also to congratulate Ambassador Vilović on his assumption of the chairmanship of the PBC, and we wish him every success in the discharge of his mandate.

Since its creation, the PBC has played a pivotal role. Its composition, with its members representing various United Nations bodies, must continue to be used effectively so as to increase its value added. The new format of the report (S/2013/63), which we welcome, makes it possible to highlight both the progress made and existing gaps where the Commission should focus its efforts. The progress made in 2012, which is based mostly on the 2010 recommendations, is undeniable.

With regard to the mobilization of resources, the success of the Burundi donors conference and the work done by the Guinea configuration with the help of the Working Group should serve as a basis for a best-practices model that could be duplicated elsewhere, adapting it, of course, to the specific needs of each configuration. In addition, the strengthening of partnerships with international and regional financial institutions, including the World Bank and the African Development Bank, is encouraging and should be further developed.

As part of that strengthening, we welcome the upcoming participation of the Peacebuilding Support Office in the annual meeting of the African Development Bank, to be held next May in Marrakesh. Among the successes achieved, I would cite the achievements made with respect to hubs for access to regional security and justice in Liberia, in supporting the electoral process in Sierra Leone, and in providing support to the planning process for the new poverty-reduction strategy in Burundi.

All of those examples are an illustration of the political support provided by the PBC to the countries on its agenda. Of course, gaps remain in terms of the political accompaniment of the Commission, as was shown by the institutional crises affecting Guinea-Bissau and, more recently, the Central African Republic. The situation in those countries reminds us of the need to attack the root causes of instability and should encourage us to start an in-depth reflection on the measures to take in similar situations. Of course, we must keep in mind that it is when political instability prevails that those countries most need the attention and support of the international community the most.

On another topic, we note that national ownership, a principle that is widely accepted and supported by all, is closely linked to the strengthening of civilian capacity. In September 2012, Morocco hosted a regional consultation on the strengthening of civilian capacities in the Arab world in Rabat, and we attach particular importance to this issue for a number of reasons. The strengthening of South-South and triangular cooperation is a diplomatic priority for Morocco, and over the past few years my country has developed, in this respect, a proactive policy on the sharing of expertise in a number of areas. However, we are aware that there is a need to clarify how the initiatives on this issue are to be implemented. In that respect, we support the idea of a new paradigm under which South-South and triangular cooperation would be able, under the Peacebuilding Commission, to respond to the priorities identified by the countries concerned and strengthen national ownership.

Another crucial issue is the relationship between the Peacebuilding Commission and the other United Nations organs, in particular the Security Council. Significant progress has been made in that regard. Indeed, resolution 2097 (2013), which provides for the progressive drawdown of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, spells out in a detailed manner the role of the Commission in that sensitive process. The Commission will also be called upon to contribute to the upcoming adaptation of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic.

During Morocco's presidency of the Council in December 2012, we convened a debate on post-conflict

peacebuilding (S/PV.6897) that culminated in the adoption of a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/29). That statement noted in particular the important role played by the Commission in prioritizing an integrated and coherent to peacebuilding and the relationship between the two bodies. In the same vein, with respect to the discussion on the situation in countries on the Commission's agenda, we welcome the participation by the Chairs of the country-specific configurations of those countries. It is clear that those configurations provide undeniable added value and a specific perspective that helps the Council in its consideration of and decision-making concerning issues that are also under consideration by the Commission.

With respect to the Peacebuilding Fund, we have taken note of the report of the Secretary-General (A/67/711), and we welcome the significant increase in contributions to the Fund. As a result, we call on the Fund to increase its support to the countries on the agenda of the Commission and to countries that are still fragile that request it.

Finally, we have taken particular note of the programme of work for the future, and we reiterate Morocco's willingness to participate actively in the ongoing reflection aimed at refining the work and approach of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Ms. Lucas (Luxembourg) (*spoke in French*): I thank Rwanda for having organized this briefing on the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission (S/2013/63). Allow me to congratulate Ambassador Momen on his dynamic chairmanship of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2012 and to thank him for his briefing. I also welcome the statement of Ambassador Ranko Vilović, which quite rightly focused on the strengthening of the relationship between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission.

As our exchanges on the subject have shown, there is consensus on how important the work of the PBC is. Its mandate, which is based on resolutions 1645 (2005) and 1646 (2005)and has been refined through the work of the Organizational Committee and the country-specific configurations, is to ensure that the countries on its agenda do not relapse into conflict and violence. It seeks to achieve that noble goal by providing political support and advocacy, support to coordination among international partners, and support for resource mobilization. Thanks to the help of all its members and the concerned parties in the countries on its agenda, and with the support of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the Commission achieved encouraging success in 2012, as documented in the report before us.

Despite the progress achieved by the PBC in 2012, the report notes that much remains to be done. I would therefore like to focus on what we, as members of the Security Council, can do to support the Commission in its mandate in service to our common objective. From the experience I have gained as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau country-specific configuration since February 2011 and as a member of the Council for several months now, I would like to address three conditions that we believe are important for the success of the PBC.

The first condition is to be found within the countries supported by the PBC. They must find the political will to rise above the deeply rooted causes of the conflicts of the past: poverty; socioeconomic exclusion; political, ethnic and identity-based rivalries; corruption; bad governance; and external impacts and interference. We all recognize that those primarily responsible for peacebuilding are the State entities of the country in question, foremost among which is the Government. It is in that respect that the Commission can and must establish trusting partnerships in which it identifies and supports the reformers within Governments who are prepared to fully invest in the future of their country and work for the good of its citizens.

The six countries supported by the PBC have highlighted their willingness to emerge from their fragile situation by joining the Group of Seven Plus and contributing to the creation of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. That solemn commitment is primarily centred on cooperation between a national Government desirous to fulfil its duties and its international partners desirous to cooperate in a responsible and sustainable manner. It also sets the milestones for an irreversible exit from a fragile situation by putting forward a unique national vision and transition plan. In that respect, we believe that additional efforts must be made to align peacebuilding commitments with a given country's vision for the success of its transition.

On a more technical level, we believe that the civilian capacities initiative is a good chance to simplify and accelerate the strengthening of the institutional capacities in the countries on the PBC agenda. At the same time, we must remain aware of the fact that the countries supported by the PBC should be viewed in

their regional context. The common and cross-border challenges and obstacles involved in peacebuilding must necessarily be part of our analysis so that we can find appropriate solutions to them. To that end, the country-specific configurations of the countries that are members of the Mano River Union — Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone — are planning a meeting on the challenges that face the region as a whole, with the help and under the guidance of the Secretary General of the Union.

In 2012, during the debate held on this issue (S/PV.6897), almost every Council member highlighted the importance of the improved coordination of peacebuilding activities, and most wanted to see it done by the country-specific configurations of the Commission. Such coordination requires close ties among all the international stakeholders that support peacebuilding and the strengthening of the State in the countries in question. That will be carried out primarily within the countries themselves, through the United Nations high representatives on the ground, as well as in New York.

The second condition that is necessary for the success of the Peacebuilding Commission is a Peacebuilding Support Office that is strong and capable of playing the support and coordination role within the United Nations system that is expected of it. Under the firm hand of Assistant Secretary-General Judy Cheng-Hopkins, the personnel of the Peacebuilding Support Office has done commendable work.

Like other Council members, we believe that the Peacebuilding Commission is most useful in its country-specific configurations. Therefore, the Office must devote more significant resources to support for those configurations. The PBSO must also take on a central role as coordinator of peacebuilding work within the United Nations system, both to ensure a better exchange of information and analysis between the various departments and entities of the system and the country-specific configurations, and to contribute to including, in a crosscutting manner, the idea of peacebuilding in the work of the United Nations. In that context, maintaining triangular, close and constructive relationships of trust between country configurations, high United Nations officials on the ground, the Special Representatives and executives of the Secretary-General, the resident coordinators and the Peacebuilding Support Office is particularly important.

The third condition for success is that we must overcome the uncertainties that seem to persist in relations between the Security Council and the Commission. The success or failure of a peacebuilding process affects the Council as well as the Commission. The work and responsibilities of the Council and the Commission are inextricably entwined — a fact that is also reflected in their overlapping makeups. Thus the five permanent members of the Council also have permanent seats on the PBC's Organizational Committee. Guatemala and Morocco will participate in its work in 2013. As one of the principal troop-contributing countries, Pakistan is active in the Commission.

Finally, Luxembourg, a non-permanent member of the Council in 2013 and 2014, has chaired the Guinea country configuration since February 2011. I would therefore like to reiterate in particular the recommendation that the Chairs of the country configurations be allowed to participate in the Council's private consultations. Luxembourg is convinced that it can bring added value in terms of analysis and perspective. It can help shed light on the root causes of conflicts, especially socioeconomic factors and the effects of exclusion, through which countries run the risk of relapsing into conflict. The country configurations may be able to support States more closely than the Council can; their input, based on a relationship of trust established with the country's authorities, can only be of benefit to the Council's consultations. I would also like to encourage my colleagues on the Council who will be assuming the presidency in the next few months to consider inviting the Chairs of the country configurations to private consultations, particularly when discussing mandate renewals.

I welcome the possibility of engaging in deeper discussions at the interactive dialogue that will be held tomorrow between the country representatives, along with the Commission, the Chairs of the country configurations and the members of the Security Council.

Mrs. Perceval (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): I will try to be brief, since my positions coincide with a number of the suggestions made by my colleagues. I would like to thank Rwanda for having organized this meeting on the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and the Chair of the PBC and Mr. Abulkalam Abdul Momen of Bangladesh for their statements.

As noted in the 2010 review of the peacebuilding architecture (S/2010/393, annex), an effective response on the part of the Organization is required to produce a broad and coordinated strategy based on local authorities' identification of priorities so as to establish goals and specific deadlines. The review also stated that this task requires countries to undertake activities promoting humanitarian assistance and the restoration of the rule of law, develop plans for security and justice policies, and promote sustainable development and a vigorous and democratic policy aimed at protecting and promoting human rights. Those challenges are still very much with us, and we feel it is important to support a peacebuilding strategy in post-conflict situations based on three elements that various speakers have highlighted. The first of these is the issue of national responsibility, the second is coordination with the United Nations, and the third is the complementarity of regional organizations.

The first of these areas, the principle of national responsibility in peacebuilding activities, is a priority. At the same time, it must be founded on the protection and promotion of human rights, ensuring the involvement of society as a whole, without any discrimination, and encouraging the conditions and opportunities that allow all to participate on an equal footing. Such involvement and broad-based participation, without discrimination or exclusion, should be reflected throughout the entire reconstruction process and based on the priorities established by the local authorities and demanded by society as a whole. We realize that this is complex and difficult, but what is important is consensus and agreement; that is the best way to deal with such situations effectively and legitimately and to address the challenges of the realities that emerge after a conflict.

We are pleased to see that in its 2012 programme the PBC reaffirmed the centrality of a strong national role in peacebuilding, as exemplified by the its support during the transition of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, and for the holding of free, fair and peaceful elections in Sierra Leone — long sought by the international community — as well as the mobilization of resources in support of a new poverty-reduction strategy in Burundi. All of these unquestionably demonstrate the real and potential importance of the work of the PBC, shown on the practical level in its ability to mobilize, promote and launch constructive dialogue with the relevant national actors.

Regrettably, the collapse of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau interrupted the electoral process there during the period covered by the report (S/2013/63). And, most recently, the failure of constitutional order in the Central African Republic was preceded and followed by renewed hostile activities, revealing the limits of the PBC's ability to help countries if the countries themselves do not possess a credible, firm and stable national commitment, and if they cannot take the necessary steps themselves to address the fundamental causes that can lead to instability or situations where conflict will overwhelm peace. It is clear that the degree of legitimacy that the PBC's political support can bestow on countries on its agenda must be sustained and combined, as has been said, with the effective, clear commitment of the countries themselves.

For the second aspect, the coordination of the peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations, the Commission is in a privileged position when it comes to mobilizing and making assistance with resources for peacebuilding activities — financial, technical and political — more effective, as well as in its ability to establish agreements and provide strategic links with regional and international actors in order to help ensure that every effort contributes to strengthening institutions and is in line with the country's priorities.

On that point and because I promised to be concise, the representatives of China and other countries underscored an intangible but decisive factor that arises when financial, economic or technical cooperation is being established with countries that request and need it. If we consider the lessons learned in the cases of our countries in Latin America, there is a very high social, economic, cultural and institutional cost involved. Based on lessons learned, we support the idea that such cooperation cannot be used as the sole model or as an imposed solution, particularly when attempts are made to continue imposing such models or solutions even after economic growth and social inclusion have clearly failed. That is not only the case in countries in my region; it is also clear that such one-size-fits-all solutions being imposed on countries are today actually impeding and undermining the possibilities for well-being, social cohesion and the rule of law in the countries concerned.

Therefore, we should not impose solutions, but rather should favour them; we should not preach, but rather discuss and respect the will and the priorities of the countries concerned. The bottom line should be full

respect for the rule of law and human rights. At the same time, as noted by the Ambassador of Guatemala, it is not enough to have a more fluid, ongoing, frank and strategic relationship between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council. We must also look at the capacity and functions of all of the parts of the Organization and ensure that there is an efficient, comprehensive and clear link among them.

When we talk about cooperation with post-conflict countries and societies, I think it would also be very interesting to consider what is happening with regard to financial cooperation. What is the situation with regard to the conditions for access to credit, for example, that are imposed on post-conflict countries? What is happening with economic and financial cooperation and the need to guarantee gradual, progressive, continuous and effective access for post-conflict societies to universal economic, social and cultural rights, not to mention political and civilian rights, particularly with regard to women's equality, education, culture, jobs for young people and the human rights of children. I think that all of those aspects must be considered as well because we are discussing the conditionalities tied to financing and cooperation mechanisms in other forums and bodies outside of the Organization.

The practice of inviting the Chairs of the country configurations for Liberia and Sierra Leone to inform the Council before renewing the mandates of the peacekeeping missions undoubtedly ensures that the Commission can fully carry out the advisory role assigned to it by the United Nations and enables the Security Council to draw further on the experience of the Peacebuilding Commission. We believe that this practice should be applied to the other countries on the Commission's agenda where there is a United Nations presence on the ground, as we saw recently with the Central African Republic, and where developments are incompatible with the peacebuilding agenda in the country. The interactive dialogue scheduled for tomorrow with the Chairs of the country configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission, which recently has followed Security Council meetings on the subject, certainly affords us a great opportunity to think across the board about the core problems and challenges, not only for the Peacebuilding Commission, but also for the Council.

The issue of the associations and the promotion of cohesion leads me to affirm, as my last point, that the role of regional organizations and subregional organizations, as established under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, entails the need to strengthen the capacities of the regional systems to support countries recovering and rebuilding after a conflict. In that regard, I think it would also be interesting to include the model of South-South cooperation, which is governed by the principles of complementarity and solidarity. The progress that we have made in focusing on South-South cooperation could also help us to understand and guide us in how we think about the role of regional and subregional cooperation with the understanding that it is only the principles of complementarity and solidarity that should really guide us. That is because once again we are seeing that the lack of security in and destablization of a country affect security and stability in neighbouring countries. If a region is unstable, we cannot expect every country there to develop and prosper.

Therefore, that relationship and link between post-conflict countries with regional organizations has key strategic power. It does not exclude the mission and functions of the United Nations as an international system, but gives it predictability that further strengths the complex and challenging stage of ensuring lasting peace, which, as we know, goes hand in hand with political stability and social justice.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Rwanda.

I would like to thank the former Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen, and the current Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Permanent Representative of Croatia, Ambassador Ranko Vilović, for their statements.

Let me start by saying that Rwanda considers peacebuilding processes to be of vital importance and constitutes a fundamental stage if countries are to overcome the root causes of conflicts. Within the United Nations system, the Peacebuilding Commission has been given the role of proposing and advising on strategies for post-conflict recovery and bringing together all the relevant actors involved in political, financial and technical resource mobilization. That continues to be an important, yet very complex and challenging role. I also believe that the Security Council can and should contribute to the Commission's effort to play such a role.

Therefore, my statement today will focus on two main issues: first, the impact and effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission, and secondly, the relationship of the Peacebuilding Commission with the Security Council.

With regard to the impact and effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission, Rwanda believes that the Commission can have an impact only if it is able to leverage its unique membership structure by bringing political support to its engagement in the field, as well as within intergovernmental forums and with strong advocacy. Furthermore, being on the PBC agenda must entail certain responsibilities and expectations, such as readiness to undertake specific financial, political and technical tasks or to share expertise and experience around country-specific priority areas.

Collective support for the countries on the PBC agenda should focus on building national capacities. We know from experience that there is no substitute for strengthening national institutions as the only way to achieve sustainable results. The generation of local and national capacities and ownership of processes, strategies and policies are indispensable to averting a relapse into conflict. It is of the utmost importance to create the conditions for countries to enjoy their sovereign rights, generate development and promote the welfare of their populations.

Within the PBC's unique membership structure, there is a wealth of expertise and experience, as well as financial resources, which each member should be prepared to share and contribute depending on its capacities and comparative advantages. The Commission could become a viable platform for promoting South-South cooperation that is focused on experience-sharing in strengthening core Government functions and the development of core national institutions.

There is also a need for coordination and coherence within the United Nations. Rwanda calls upon the PBC to maintain mutually reinforcing relations with the senior United Nations leadership in the field. The PBC can put the political weight of its membership behind the United Nations leadership at the country level, and the United Nations missions are expected in turn to support and pursue the PBC areas of engagement and overall objectives. We also believe that the PBC should support the United Nations in delivering as one, remain focused on nationally identified priorities in the field, and ensure that United Nations guidance to field missions is aligned with national peacebuilding priorities.

Coordination and coherence are relevant not only between the PBC and United Nations entities, but also among external actors. The PBC should continue to explore practical ways to align such activities as the assessment and planning of bilateral, regional and multilateral actors behind national peacebuilding priorities. Regional and subregional organizations play an important role in that process. The World Bank and the African Development Bank play an important role in supporting intermediate and long-term recovery and in rebuilding the social, economic and financial structures of countries in transition from conflict.

Resource mobilization is also linked to coherence and coordination, as well as to political progress. We call for continued advocacy on behalf of the countries on the agenda of the PBC in order to help underscore political and socioeconomic progress to attract assistance and/or investment, as well as to identify entry points to tap into the potential of foundations, the private sector and other non-traditional donors.

It is also important to pursue the mapping of capacities, actors and resource flows with a view to identifying gaps, channeling the necessary resources to fill them, and supporting the creation of viable national donor coordination mechanisms. We can therefore certainly conclude that the effectiveness and strength of the PBC lie in the capacity and readiness of its members to use it as the linchpin of multilateral and coordinated support to sustainable peace and development, and to bridge the traditional gap between the global security and development architectures.

On the relationship between the Security Council and the PBC, let me first emphasize that the joint membership should play a leading role in guiding the nature and scope of the PBC advisory role. Among other things, the PBC should be tasked with monitoring the effectiveness of the peacebuilding mandates of United Nations missions, and suggest course adjustments as necessary. The PBC should be asked by the Council to provide specific information on coherence among key actors, the support of international partners, the political commitment of national actors, and risks to the peacebuilding process in the countries concerned.

In countries on its agenda, the PBC is in a good position to support a successful and smooth transition and drawdown of United Nations missions. The Security

Council needs to provide clarity on the division of roles and responsibilities between the PBC and the senior United Nations leadership in the field, and ensure that United Nations missions report on support to the peacebuilding priority areas and to PBC engagement in these areas. In order to improve the modalities of engagement and interaction, we agree with the PBC Chairperson that there is a need for greater use of informal interactive dialogues, with particular attention to timing and purpose.

In that spirit, and building on the initiative of the Colombian presidency of July 2012, Rwanda will hold an interactive dialogue among the Security Council, the leadership of the Commission and the countries on its agenda in order to provide an opportunity to exchange opinions on how we can further strengthen the nature and scope of the Commission's advisory role to the Security Council.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

There are no more names inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.6955

Security Council

Sixty-eighth year

Provisional

6955th meeting
Thursday, 25 April 2013, 3 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Gasana	(Rwanda)
Members:	Argentina	Mrs. Perceval
	Australia	Ms. King
	Azerbaijan	Mr. Sharifov
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Briens
	Guatemala	Mr. Rosenthal
	Luxembourg	Mr. Maes
	Morocco	Mr. Bouchaara
	Pakistan	Mr. Tarar
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Shin Dong Ik
	Russian Federation	Mr. Pankin
	Togo	Mr. M'Beou
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis

Agenda

The situation in Somalia

Letter dated 19 April 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/239)

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13-31311 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Somalia

Letter dated 19 April 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/239)

The President: Under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting.

On behalf of the Security Council, I welcome the presence at this meeting of His Excellency Mr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2013/239, which contains a letter dated 19 April 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting the results of the Secretary-General's technical assessment mission to Somalia, pursuant to resolution 2093 (2013).

I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman.

Mr. Feltman: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on recent developments in Somalia and on the findings of the technical assessment mission, as requested in resolution 2093 (2013).

I shall start with a brief political update. The Federal Government of Somalia has continued implementing its six-pillar policy for stabilization and peacebuilding in the country. Notably, it has been reaching out beyond Mogadishu in an effort to realize its vision for a federal State of Somalia. The agreement between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somaliland administration to continue dialogue and increase cooperation, signed earlier this month, is a welcome step forward. Similarly, Prime Minister Shirdon's listening tour — aimed at building trust and consensus between Mogadishu, existing regional administrations and fledgling ones — marks an important step in the national reconciliation and federal State-building process.

However, the Government's approach to building new regional administrations is not accepted by all. An interim draft charter to establish a so-called Jubaland state in southern Somalia was ratified by representatives from three regions on April 2 and is expected to result in the election of a president for Jubaland state in the coming days. While the draft charter envisages Jubaland state as part of the federal system, the Federal Government regards it as unconstitutional, and efforts to find a compromise have reached an impasse. A great deal more work is needed to tackle the inevitable challenges that will arise in the development of a federal system in Somalia.

There have been several alarming reminders of the fragile security situation inside Somalia. On 17 March, Al-Shabaab retook the town of Hudur hours after Ethiopian National Defence Forces withdrew. Multiple suicide bombings carried out by Al-Shabaab have claimed the lives of innocent Somali civilians in Mogadishu. The most recent, on 14 April, involved several coordinated attacks, including a double suicide bombing at the regional court in the capital. More than 50 people were reportedly killed.

The courthouse attacks were more sophisticated and coordinated than the previous attacks in Somalia, indicating external support, but have so far failed to undermine the optimism that permeates Mogadishu. However, they underscore the need to rapidly strengthen security in Somalia.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is reaching its operational limit in terms of holding and expanding areas under its control. Innovative thinking is required to address that challenge. Additional resources, including enablers and force multipliers, as well as the means to reconfigure the AMISOM forces, are required if it is to maintain the impressive momentum of the past year. The anticipated withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces will add further strain. We remain concerned about the clear challenges faced by AMISOM and the Somali national forces in their current state. A better funded and coordinated strategic approach that recognizes that well-trained and equipped Somali forces are the ultimate exit strategy for international military operations in Somalia is required by the international community.

The United Nations has continued dialogue with the Federal Government, as well as the countries of the region and partner organizations. This week, I spoke

with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. We discussed the importance of developing mutually reinforcing working relations with Somalia's neighbours. Today, the Secretary-General and I had constructive meetings with Mr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, who is here with us today, where we underscored the important role that Ethiopia is playing in ensuring stability in Somalia. We urged close coordination between the Ethiopians and AMISOM regarding Ethiopia's planned withdrawal of its forces from Somalia. I have also been in contact with the African Union and the European Union to ensure a coherent approach to our support to Somalia.

The United Nations continues to work with the Federal Government and local authorities in Somalia to establish a new United Nations mission to support peacebuilding and state-building, as requested in resolution 2093 (2013). We are now very clear as to how the United Nations should support the Government through 2016. In his letter to the Council (see S/2013/239, annex), the Secretary-General has outlined his vision for a new United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNAMSOM) — the vehicle that is designed to deliver that support.

For that and other reasons, the Mission's core role will be to act as an enabler, helping to create and to galvanize the political and strategic environment in which stabilization and peacebuilding can proceed, including by leveraging other parts of the United Nations system and international partners. Substantively, the Mission will have four key areas of focus. It will provide good offices, support reconciliation efforts and assist with the mediation of the politically sensitive challenges associated with the constitutional review and the question of federalism.

It will help to build national capacities in the rule of law and the security sector and in the protection and promotion of human rights at all levels of society. It will also seek to enhance the Government's lead in coordinating international assistance efforts through the framework of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Through joint task teams, the Mission will also work with the country team and other partners on urgent issues, such as stabilization in the newly recovered areas, maritime issues, economic triggers of violence and capacity development.

The guiding principles outlined by the Secretary-General will be critical to the success of UNAMSOM and, indeed, of the United Nations system as a whole in Somalia. Building Somali capacity and supporting Somali leadership will be central to our efforts to strengthen the peace process. In the longer run, we hope that it will be Somali solutions that will bring an end to conflict and determine the best models for Somalia's development. That is at the heart of the new United Nations Mission's approach.

The new mission will need to be agile, flexible and mobile to respond and adapt to evolving priorities. The limited space and resources and the challenging security environment mean that the mission will have a limited number of permanent residential staff. However, it will need the resources to bring in specialized experts to support emerging priorities. It will also need a concept of support and a range of security options to enable the United Nations to work side by side with Somalis, including in Villa Somalia.

Such a model may be expensive given the security environment of Somalia but, for the United Nations to be relevant, it will require the strong support of the Council, in particular, and of Member States, in general.

Collaboration and partnership will also be critical. The Mission will rely on the United Nations country team to bring programmatic support to the political and strategic advice that it will provide, while ensuring that the humanitarian space is protected. Joint leadership and planning teams will guide the work associated with the United Nations presence in Somalia. The Mission will also have a core pillar of analysts and planners, who will provide a multiplier effect, working to integrate the Mission's capacity and that of the country team and to link those capacities with what AMISOM and other partners would provide.

We look forward to strengthening our new strategic partnerships with the African Union and AMISOM through the new mission. We acknowledge that both organizations play essential roles in supporting Somalia's peacebuilding in all its aspects. We are committed to realizing the synergies between those roles and the United Nations Mission. UNAMSOM and AMISOM planners will meet as soon as the new mission is up and running to work out the parameters of our practical partnership on the ground. As in so many areas, the United Nations partnership with the African Union is vital to our ability to achieve our objectives. We look forward to ongoing cooperation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, as well.

The United Nations will require a strong level of commitment from the international community if UNAMSOM is to succeed in the coordination role envisaged by the Council in resolution 2093 (2013). That means a clear commitment to working coherently and patiently to allow the Federal Government to develop its plans and build its capacities. The current spectre of fragmented and duplicative efforts at international assistance is inefficient and could be counterproductive. It risks overwhelming the nascent national capacity. The President of Somalia has told us that. We are hopeful that the conference to be held in London next month and other meetings scheduled in Brussels and Tokyo later in the year will help us to agree on a framework for future coordination.

The new mission represents a fresh start for the United Nations in Somalia and a renewed commitment by the Council to support Somali-owned peacebuilding. Results will not be achieved overnight. If we are genuinely committed to Somali leadership, we must be prepared to let Somalis set the timelines, as well as the priorities, and to keep our expectations realistic. However, we firmly believe that the design of the new mission is grounded in real needs and a well-thought-out analysis of the objective reality in Somalia today, as well as in the great goodwill that exists in the international community. With the Council's support, we believe that we can help continue to move that daunting agenda forward.

The President: I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the representative of Somalia.

Mr. Duale (Somalia): I thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this meeting on Somalia and, in particular, on the assessment report on which we have just been briefed (see S/2013/239, annex).

I thank the Council for inviting me to address it today. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General for his briefing. On behalf of my Government, I also thank the assessment team that prepared the report. It is one of the best reports I have ever seen. It is clear, it is factual, and it prescribes the medicine Somalia needs right now to get out of the predicament that it is in.

I also thank the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Governments of countries that have saved us from Al-Shabaab, in particular our brothers and sisters from Africa. AMISOM has done a good job, and I believe it is now time to ensure that the Somali National Security Forces are able in due course to take over the responsibilities of clearing Al-Shabaab out of all parts of Somalia, thereby providing stability and security for the country.

I would also take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for our brother, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, who is here with us. This is the first time I have met him, and I am honoured to do so.

I believe that Somalia has passed through many stages. We are now at a time when we can see the light at the end of the tunnel. We hope that the contents of the report will be realized through the full support of the Security Council, and the sooner, the better. Furthermore, I believe that most of the findings and recommendations on the many issues in the report are consonant with what our President set forth in his six-pillar policy as soon as he was elected. The report therefore is very much in accord with what the Government of Somalia believes in and wishes to see realized as soon as possible.

I thank the Security Council and the members of the Council who asked the Secretary-General to undertake the assessment.

The President: I give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Mr. Ghebreyesus (Ethiopia): Mr. President, let me start by thanking you for this opportunity to address the Security Council. As the new Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, I am delighted — really pleased — to make my maiden statement to the Security Council under the presidency of Rwanda, a country which not long ago came out of a horrendous tragedy, quickly stood on its feet and got to where it is now — a beacon of hope for our Africa. Let me also express appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report (S/2013/239, annex).

I would also like to thank the Security Council for having begun a process of very fruitful cooperation with the African Union Peace and Security Council, which we hope will continue to be strengthened; there is, undoubtedly, ample room for doing so. I also wish to thank the Security Council for having adopted resolution 2093 (2013), which, among other things, requested the Secretary-General to urgently field a technical assessment mission to Somalia with a view

to ensuring the effective implementation of the new approach to United Nations support for Somalia set forth in that resolution.

I also wish to thank the members of the technical assessment mission for what is, in our judgment, a very useful report. The report has addressed all the relevant issues the mission was called upon to look at. The mission's assessment of the overall political and security environment and of the humanitarian situation in Somalia is both comprehensive and valid. The report could not have put it better when, in describing the political environment, it says that it is "extremely complex, but there are also impressive capacities for peace and dialogue" (*S/2013/239, annex, para. 5*). We fully agree that the "strong political will of the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia to rebuild their war-torn society bodes well for the peacebuilding and State-building process" (*ibid.*). The assessment also highlights a critical achievement that had eluded Somalia for more than 20 years when it states quite correctly that the "Government has considerable legitimacy and inspires hope and optimism" (*ibid.*). Indeed, the Government's legitimacy can only be enhanced when it is in a position to provide services to society, thereby strengthening its credibility.

The report also underlines the challenges the Federal Government of Somalia is facing, which consist mostly of security issues. In that regard, the assessment manages to reflect the situation on the ground as objectively as possible, for example, when it says that

> "Somalia is a country in which the international community is seeking to make and build peace in the context of ongoing war and active counter-insurgency operations" (*ibid., para. 6*).

The report also underlines — correctly, in our view — that, although the "struggle against Al-Shabaab has turned a corner... it is far from over" (*ibid.*). We are also very convinced that the principles underlined by the technical assessment mission as a guide for its work — namely, Somali national ownership, and collaboration and partnership with various actors, particularly the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), inter alia — are indeed critical, and that is also what common sense would counsel.

Obviously, in the light of the foregoing, and taking into account both the opportunities, which are immense, and the challenges, it appears that a more serious and stronger effort must be made in order to ensure that the momentum gained in Somalia is not only maintained, but accelerated. That is particularly necessary in the security area. It cannot be denied that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) needs greater support, particularly in terms of "additional enablers and force multipliers" (*ibid., para. 46*). In fact, as the technical assessment mission says in the report, AMISOM, whose support is critical to ensuring the security of the new assistance mission in Somalia, will not, in many instances, be in a position to provide such services within the existing troop ceiling.

The Secretary-General reminds the Council in his report of his earlier recommendation with respect to the option of deploying a United Nations or joint African Union-United Nations peacekeeping operation. But he has introduced a caveat by saying that the matter should be taken up "as conventional combat operations against Al-Shabaab end" (*ibid.*). We feel that more can be done in that regard, and in our judgment, there is no reason why the two proposed options should not be examined immediately, with a view to speeding up the implementation of one of them.

But even more critical is ensuring that everything necessary is done to support the Somali National Security Forces so that they can achieve the capacity to play their proper role in maintaining peace and security throughout the country. In our opinion, that is doable if support is provided by Member States on the basis of an integrated approach and not, as pointed out by the technical assessment mission and reiterated in the report of the Secretary-General, in a fragmented manner.

In that regard, I wish to highlight paragraph 22 of resolution 2093 (2013), on supporting the Government's efforts to manage and coordinate international assistance, particularly in the security sector. It appears to us that the way to proceed is to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the Somali National Security Forces are up and running, including in terms of providing security for a new United Nations mission and avoiding resort to the use of international private security companies.

The proposal by the assessment mission in that regard might need to be examined carefully. All this is an argument for doing more to ensure that the Somali National Security Forces are given all the necessary support to handle security throughout the country. That

is also what we ourselves have been trying to contribute in practice.

Let me before closing refer to one issue that is related to the role of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces and to what the technical assessment mission has referred to as their announced withdrawal from Hudur and their anticipated withdrawal from Baidoa. There has been some misperception concerning this matter which requires explanation. The question of lack of consultation or absence of prior notification on the part of Ethiopia is absolutely groundless. Those who need to know were informed many months prior to the withdrawal. There is no misunderstanding here. What happened does not in any way signify any shirking of responsibility on Ethiopia's part, though the question of burden-sharing is something that has always been a source of concern for us.

But more important was whether Ethiopian forces were deployed in a way that added value in terms of addressing the major threat to the encouraging momentum that has been created in Somalia. Our conclusion was that they were not, but that is in no way related to any diminished commitment on Ethiopia's part to continue being a factor for peace and stability in Somalia. But again, as I said earlier, the question of burden-sharing and the issue related to the effective use of available forces is something to which we attach great importance. These are issues that we would be ready to discuss with stakeholders.

We feel that we have come a long way in Somalia. Not keeping up the momentum is not an option. It is our earnest hope that the new approach and the new mission in Somalia will help to further strengthen the foundation for sustainable peace in Somalia, which no doubt will require, first of all, ensuring that the security environment continues to improve. Both IGAD and the African Union are ready to continue their full cooperation with the Security Council to ensure that that happens. It is our hope that there will be a similar commitment on the part of both the Security Council and the Secretariat to deepen cooperation with the African Union. When everything is said and done, what is critical in the end is that no support will produce results unless it is based on the priorities set by the Government and unless ownership by the Somali Government is respected.

The President: There are no more speakers inscribed on my list. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.6956

Security Council

Sixty-eighth year

Provisional

6956th meeting
Monday, 29 April 2013, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Gasana	(Rwanda)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Stancanelli
	Australia	Ms. King
	Azerbaijan	Mr. Mehdiyev
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Briens
	Guatemala	Mr. Rosenthal
	Luxembourg	Mr. Maes
	Morocco	Mr. Loulichki
	Pakistan	Mr. Masood Khan
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Kim Sook
	Russian Federation	Mr. Pankin
	Togo	Mr. M'Beou
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Ms. Rice

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2013/225)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.

13-31674 (E)

Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2013/225)

The President: Under rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Sudan to participate in this meeting.

Under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedures, I invite Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2013/225, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous (*spoke in French*): I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to update the Council on the situation in Darfur. Council members have before them the report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/225) on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), dated 10 April 2013. I would like to focus on the most recent developments in the peace process and in the security and humanitarian situations.

With respect to the political situation, during the days leading up to the donor conference held in Doha on 7 and 8 April, several hundred displaced people held peaceful protests in the Kalma and Hassa Hissa camps, in Southern and Central Darfur, respectively. The protesters raised the issues of insecurity, unresolved land disputes and the predominance of armed militias as reasons for their opposition to the Doha conference. No arrests were reported.

At the conference, most participants expressed strong political support for the Darfur Development Strategy, which is the framework serving as the basis for economic reconstruction, development and poverty eradication. The total amount pledged for implementing the Strategy was $3.7 billion, including $2.65 billion previously committed by the Government of the Sudan and $500 million from Qatar. We must take note of the fact that the total amount fell short of the target of $7.2 billion set by the Development Strategy for the next six years.

Concerning the adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur by the faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Mohamed Bashar, hostilities broke out between that group and JEM forces loyal to Gibril Ibrahim, near Darma, 220 kilometres north-east of El Geneina in Northern Darfur, on 18 April. Two soldiers from Mohamed Bashar's forces were killed and nine were wounded in the clashes. UNAMID is currently investigating the exact cause of the clashes. In addition, the Mission has called on the factions to stop the hostilities and to resolve their differences through dialogue.

On April 24, the Liberation and Justice Movement informed the authorities of its intention to immediately withdraw from the Government. The reasons cited by the Movement for that decision were the delays in the implementation of the Doha Document and the expulsion from the Sudan of members of the International Republican Institute by the authorities earlier that day. The Institute, which is an international non-governmental organization, was involved in capacity-building for the Movement and provided technical assistance to support the transformation of the Movement into a political party. The high-level negotiations between representatives of the National Congress Party and the Liberation and Justice Movement with regard to the ongoing participation of the Movement in the Government are underway.

With regard to the security situation, the escalation of the conflict in Darfur due to military confrontations and intercommunal clashes is the source of serious concern. Humanitarian agencies estimate that this year the clashes have resulted in the displacement of 214,000 people, including 24,000 to Chad. That is much more than the total for last year.

Following the military hostilities described in the report of the Secretary-General, the Government and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Minni Minawi clashed on several occasions this month in Eastern and Southern Darfur. On 6 April, SLA forces seized control of Labado and Muhajeria in Eastern Darfur. The next day, they took control of Ishma village, 30 kilometres

east of Nyala in Southern Darfur. Following those clashes, about 33,000 people are still concentrated around the UNAMID bases in Muhajeria and Labado.

Between 6 and 13 April, Sudanese military aircraft conducted intermittent offensive operations in and around those two villages. On 16 April, the Government army, supported by air operations, regained control Muhajeria and Labado. UNAMID is currently reviewing reports of casualties resulting from the fighting, which, it should be noted, diverge widely.

The authorities have prevented the Mission and humanitarian actors from providing the necessary assistance and supplies to the area while the villages were under the control of SLA-Minni Minawi. UNAMID finally gained access to provide reinforcements and provisions to the bases on 18 and 19 April. On those dates, humanitarian actors were able to begin preparing to provide the necessary assistance, which was provided on April 23. At the same time, sporadic clashes between the Government and SLA-Minni Minawi elements continued in Southern Darfur, for example in Marla to the south-east of Nyala, and, on April 22, near the Nyala airport.

(*spoke in English*)

Three days after Government forces regained control of Muhajeria, unidentified armed assailants attacked the nearby UNAMID base. The assault took place in the early hours of 19 April and lasted for 40 minutes. Tragically, one UNAMID peacekeeper was killed and two were injured in the exchange of fire. At least one of the attackers was also killed. The base was reinforced with a company of peacekeepers from Nyala later the same day.

I would like to take this opportunity to condemn unreservedly those responsible for that deeply troubling incident. I express my deepest condolences to the family and colleagues of the fallen peacekeeper, as well as to the Government of Nigeria. I call on the Government of the Sudan to swiftly bring those responsible to justice.

Intercommunal violence in Darfur involving well-armed militias has also caused significant suffering among the civilian population. On 3 April, an attempted armed robbery triggered clashes between militias drawn mainly from the Misseriya and Salamat tribes in Um Dukhun, in Central Darfur. Sporadic fighting between the groups continued and spread eastwards, between 6 and 17 April, to Rehed al Bardi, 245 kilometres south-west of Nyala, and northwards to Darlay, 130 kilometres south of Zalingei, in Central Darfur.

Community sources estimate that upwards of 68 people were killed and 60 injured in the clashes. Officials from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Chad registered the arrival of 16,000 people displaced by those precise hostilities. Government security forces prevented UNAMID from accessing the affected area until 17 April, when a patrol reached Um Dukhun and observed that several surrounding villages had been abandoned and damaged by fire.

The authorities deployed security forces to defuse tensions and formed a committee comprising State Government officials and traditional community leaders to mediate between the parties. Those efforts led to the signing on 10 April of an agreement to cease hostilities. However, intermittent fighting continued after the signing and now a second reconciliation conference is scheduled for tomorrow, Tuesday.

Further to the heavy intercommunal fighting between the Aballa and Beni Hussein militias described in the report before the Council, a reconciliation conference scheduled for 15 April was postponed by the authorities for one month to allow the parties more time to prepare. UNAMID is supporting the process through workshops on conflict resolution and the provision of logistical assistance. An isolated clash between the communities near Um Dafog, which is north of El Geneina in Western Darfur, allegedly in response to the harassment of Beni Hussein farmers by Aballa herders, highlighted that relations between the communities remain tense.

Against that backdrop of insecurity, the Government replaced, through presidential decree, the incumbent governors of Southern and Eastern Darfur with retired Sudanese Armed Forces Lieutenant General Adam Mahmoud Jar al-Nabi and Mr. Abdul Hamid Musa Kasha, respectively. While the outgoing Governor of Eastern Darfur was said to be in poor health, no explanation was provided for the decision to replace the Governor of Southern Darfur.

Movement restrictions and other obstructions imposed by the belligerent parties have continued to hamper UNAMID operations. On 2 and 6 April, Government security forces forcibly prevented UNAMID helicopters from departing from Shangil Tobaya and Saraf Umra after the crews refused to

transport local officials who did not appear on the flight manifest. Eventually, the flights did depart without the officials on board, but not without several hours of negotiations.

On 3 April, the authorities issued 401 new entry visas for UNAMID civilian police, but as of 25 April, a total of 858 visas remained outstanding, including 533 for civilian police. In an effort to address those and other issues impeding UNAMID operations, the tripartite coordination mechanism between the African Union, the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan met in Addis Ababa on 15 April. The Government representatives present urged UNAMID to coordinate more closely with security officials in Darfur to improve access. In addition, participants agreed to review the validity of outstanding visa requests submitted in 2011 and 2012.

In closing, the situation in Darfur is very troubling. While there have indeed been mildly encouraging developments in the peace process, in the meantime a fully inclusive political settlement has yet to be reached. UNAMID is working hard to implement its mandate in these circumstances, which remain very challenging. It is clear that better cooperation on the part of the Sudanese authorities and improvements in troop and police contingent equipment levels are needed to enable the mission to operate more closely to its full potential.

Furthermore, resolving the conflict continues to require a combined effort on the part of the Council, the African Union and the wider international community to persuade the belligerent parties that there is no military solution to the crisis. In that connection, it is clear that maintaining attention to the situation in Darfur amid a series of newer crises remains as important as ever.

For too long, the people of Darfur have known conflict and suffering. I urge the Council to do all that it can to help relieve their suffering and bring about an end to the fighting by supporting UNAMID and by applying additional pressure on the belligerent parties to reach a negotiated settlement.

The President: I thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Sudan.

Mr. Osman (Sudan) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Council this month. Rwanda is a friendly country that has made valuable contributions to peace in Darfur through its participation in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

I would also like to thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing and explanations concerning the situation in Darfur.

I note that Mr. Ladsous' briefing emphasized that instances of instability were caused by recent outbreaks of tribal conflict. Council members may be aware that a few clashes over natural resources took place in the region in March, leading to the displacement of some citizens. However, the situation was contained. A few days after those incidents, a reconciliation meeting took place between the tribes involved, as did a follow-up conference to resolve problems relating to internally displaced persons.

Mr. Ladsous also mentioned that some clashes took place between the Government and rebel groups, mainly as a result of the continued attacks carried out by the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi. Only yesterday, Government forces succeeded in taking control of the headquarters and main base from which those forces sought to take over Nyala and other areas, and cut off trade routes.

Two weeks ago, El Tigani Seisi, Chairperson of the Darfur Regional Authority, visited New York and met with the Secretary-General and many members of the Council. He described the positive developments that have taken place in Darfur since the Darfur Regional Authority assumed authority and began establishing its institutions and mechanisms. At those meetings, he also discussed the arrangements being made for the donors conference for Darfur that subsequently take place in Doha. It was a successful meeting, in which all members of the Council took part. We expect that the pledges made there will help in the reconstruction and development of Darfur.

It is very important to note that, now that most of their activities have been contained by the Sudanese army, the various rebel groups in Darfur are targeting civilian areas and cities outside of Darfur. Only two days ago, they participated in an attack on the city of Umm Rawaba, which is outside the Darfur region. Alongside the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North, they attacked strategic facilities, electric power stations and fuel depots, and robbed markets and banks before fleeing. This confirms that the remnants of the rebel groups in Darfur are nothing

more than bandits and outlaws without a cause, having refused to participate in the peace process. They are led by warlords who have made it clear that they are willing to target innocent civilians, rob them of their property, and intimidate and terrify peaceful communities, even in areas outside Darfur. We must take these facts into account when considering the situation in Darfur.

The attack launched against UNAMID forces some time ago further highlighted the shortcomings in UNAMID's work and performance. When faced with attack, they surrender their weapons and even their vehicles quite readily to the rebel forces. This matter requires careful consideration. Whenever UNAMID or a group of civilians have been attacked or taken hostage, we in the Government of the Sudan have made every effort to locate and prosecute the perpetrators. However, we hope that UNAMID officials will also carry out their duties by dealing with any attack on them by such rebel groups.

The report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/225) also underscores notable progress in the situation in Darfur, in particular with regard to implementing the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The report reaffirms that the Government of the Sudan has completed the transfer of funds to the Darfur Regional Authority despite the economic difficulties that the country has recently faced. The last step was the transfer of $165 million, as set out in paragraph 3 of the report before the Council.

The Council has also noted the donor conference on Darfur, at which $3.6 billion was pledged by participants, including $2 billion by the Government of the Sudan. That augurs well for the implementation of the strategy already drawn up by the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, comprising the Government of the Sudan, UNAMID and international partners. In that connection, I must express my deep gratitude to all members. The plan sets out a time-bound and detailed framework for the reconstruction and development of Darfur. It will take six years to complete. The beginning has been very promising. We hope that we will all cooperate in implementing the strategy.

With regard to the justice and accountability provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the report of the Secretary-General notes in paragraph 5 that the Special Prosecutor for Darfur has continued his investigation of violations of human rights and international law and that on 24 February, the El Fasher court sentenced six soldiers accused of killing a community leader in Abu Zereiga to death. There are now several cases being considered by the Special Prosecutor, including attacks by militia on internally displaced persons camps in the area of Kutum. That proves to us all that there is justice against all those found guilty.

In other paragraphs, the report notes that there have been constraints on UNAMID. I would like to explain that, as we said earlier, in a very few instances, the Government prefers that UNAMID does not enter areas where it might face real threats. On several occasions, the Council has noted cases and, as Mr. Ladsous mentioned, several members of UNAMID have been attacked. Regrettably, in that connection, I would however like to say, for the benefit of us all, that, when members of UNAMID face an attack by elements of rebel groups, they react passively, if not by actually fleeing from the scene of the attack, leaving behind their weapons, and sometimes even their vehicles, for the rebel groups.

As I said a month ago, such an incident took place when they were escorting a number of civilians to participate in a conference on internally displaced persons and faced such an attack. They handed over all the civilians to rebel groups. They even handed over a vehicle. I do not know if they also surrendered some of their weapons. Mr. Ladsous well knows the details. I mention that incident merely to clarify that the Government sometimes does not recommend that UNAMID move into certain areas owing to the danger there. What further complicates matters is that UNAMID deploys and does not defend itself when faced with such an attack.

With regard to visas, owing to the concern of the Government of the Sudan, I met with Mr. Ladsous on 7 April, a few days ago. I underscored to him that a senior committee has been established to review the visa issue and to expedite their issue. It was set up under the personal direction of the President. On 13 March, the committee met representatives of UNAMID. A total of 644 visas were requested. At the meeting, the Government authorities issued 412 visas. That leaves approximately 200 visa applications still being considered. Such information proves that there is constructive cooperation between the Government and UNAMID on the visa issue. In other words, there are no obstacles to the consideration of issuing visas.

At the beginning of my statement, I mentioned the despicable attack on Umm Rawaba, a city in Northern Kordofan State. In other words, it is outside Darfur. It was attacked on the morning of Saturday 27 April. The perpetrators were the SPLM-North, supported by other rebel groups. They had 100 armoured vehicles with them. They destroyed and looted the city, where there were no members of the Sudanese army. There were only police officers who were protecting places in the city such as markets, fuel depots, power plants and water points. All that infrastructure was destroyed by the SPLM-North, supported by the forces of Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi.

I leave it to Council members' wisdom to uncover the reasons why Minni Minawi and Abdul Wahid act in that manner. They have become true warlords. They have robbed eight banks and pillaged all the markets and shops in that city. They have destroyed the water plant and the electric power station. Are those people really interested in development and reconstruction in the Sudan even as they go about intimidating and killing civilians? They killed 35 unarmed civilian community leaders in the city of Abu Kershola. That is the kind of people Minni Minawi, Abdul Wahid and the SPLM-North forces really are.

Compared to the events of 2003, the remaining conflict in Darfur is based on the narrowest of rationales. We hope that the Council will help us to end the conflict by enforcing sanctions against the groups that reject peace because, when faced with constraints imposed by the army, those groups have turned to attacking other areas and killing civilians. I hope that when Council members move to the consultation room to discuss this matter, they will focus strongly on upholding standards by enforcing sanctions against movements that reject peace, or by whatever other means they deem advisable.

The President: There are no more speakers inscribed on my list. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.6957

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2013

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6957th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 30 April 2013, at 9.30 a.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"At its 6957th meeting, held in private on 30 April 2013, the Security Council considered the item entitled 'The situation in the Middle East'.

"The President, with the consent of the Council, extended an invitation under rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure to the representative of Jordan.

"The members of the Council had in front of them the letter dated 25 April 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/247).

"The members of the Council heard a briefing by the representative of Jordan.

"Members of the Council and the representative of Jordan had an exchange of views."

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United Nations S/PV.6958

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 April 2013

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 6958th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 30 April 2013, at 11.12 a.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"At its 6958th meeting, held in private on 30 April 2013, the Security Council considered the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2010/507)".

"The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Republic of Tanzania to participate in the consideration of the item without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

"In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, the President, with the consent of the Council, extended an invitation under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure to the representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

"In accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard, the President, with the consent of the Council, extended an invitation to the representative of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting.

"In accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard, the President, with the consent of the Council, extended an invitation to the representative of the Observer State of Palestine, to participate in this meeting.

"The members of the Council had an exchange of views."

13-31922 (E) 300413

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